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ANOTHER HURDLE TO HABEAS:  
THE STREAMLINED PROCEDURES ACT 
MICHELLE HERTZ 
INTRODUCTION 
Shortly before midnight on December 12, 2005, California 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger denied clemency to Crips gang 
founder and convicted quadruple murderer Stanley “Tookie” 
Williams on the eve of his execution.1 Schwarzenegger delivered his 
decision amidst an explosive public dispute over capital punishment. 
Yet underneath this visible controversy lurked a constitutional issue 
that failed to draw the same degree of popular concern but has been 
stirring the judicial system for decades: the filing of successive 
petitions for habeas corpus. 
In Williams’s case, Pasadena lawyer Verna Wefald issued an 
eleventh-hour emergency plea to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
accompanied by a 150-page habeas petition.2 Wefald’s petition—
alleging “an ‘error of constitutional magnitude [that] led to a trial that 
was so fundamentally unfair absent the error [that] no reasonable 
judge or jury would have convicted’ [Williams]”3—followed five 
similar requests to state and federal courts. The first habeas petition, 
filed with the California Supreme Court in 1984,4 alleged various Fifth 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Michelle Hertz. 
 1. See Williams v. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 979, 988, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (addressing 
Williams’s conviction). Williams died by lethal injection at 12:35 a.m. on Dec. 13, 2005, hours 
after Schwarzenegger denied clemency. See, e.g., Jenifer Warren & Maura Dolan, Tookie 
Williams Is Executed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at A1. 
 2. Henry Weinstein, Williams’ Lawyer Appeals to Supreme Court: Constitutional Issues 
Challenging the Validity of His Convictions and Death Sentence Are Raised in Request for a Stay 
of Execution, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at B8. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (listing Williams’s successive attempts at habeas relief). 
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and Sixth Amendment violations during Williams’s trial.5 This 
petition was denied in 1988.6 A second state habeas petition, filed 
January 9, 1989, was also denied.7 Williams filed his third state 
petition on September 1, 1989, and his fourth on April 14, 1994; both 
were denied.8 Subsequently, Williams filed a federal habeas petition, 
amended on November 13, 1995, arguing that he had been 
incompetent during his trial.9 Thus, courts repeatedly considered one 
defendant’s conviction for eleven years. 
Critics are sharply divided over the appropriate amount of time 
and resources that courts should devote to habeas review. Scholars 
who oppose extensive habeas protections argue that lengthier 
procedures congest courts, divert resources from other claims, and 
stall victims’ ability to heal and move on.10 Habeas supporters respond 
by emphasizing the need for judicial process and fairness, especially 
when a human life is at stake.11 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
attempted to define the boundaries of what is required to ensure full 
and fair process. Congress also interjected its own legislation, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),12 
which was, until 2005, the legislature’s latest effort toward foreclosing 
habeas relief. 
In 2005, Arizona Republican Senator Jon L. Kyl introduced new 
legislation that would have further blocked what is already an 
obstructed path toward habeas relief.13 The Streamlined Procedures 
 
 5. See People v. Williams, 751 P.2d 901, 908–11 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s 
arguments that (1) police attained unsolicited incriminating statements from the defendant, (2) 
police violated the defendant’s Miranda rights, and (3) the defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel). 
 6. Id. at 921. 
 7. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
 8. See Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (noting denial of the fourth state petition); In re 
Williams (Williams II), 870 P.2d 1072, 1095 (Cal. 1994) (denying the third state petition). 
 9. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
 10. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 
OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 367 (1983) (listing various motives for limiting habeas review). 
 11. See id. (including factors favoring broad habeas availability). 
 12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
 13. 151 CONG. REC. S5540–44 (daily ed. May 19, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl introducing 
the Streamlined Procedures Act). 
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Act (SPA)14 garnered support from politicians who believed that 
AEDPA failed to simplify habeas doctrine, yet it faced fiery 
opposition from its critics.15 Predictably, an individual’s stance on the 
proposal embodied in this Act reflects personal views of what is 
important in the judicial process: precise finality or ultimate 
protection. 
Although it is necessary to strike a balance between these two 
competing interests, the SPA’s clear preference for finality was 
unwarranted and even unconstitutional. Congress was wise not to 
adopt this legislation, which would have curtailed protections to an 
undesirable minimum and impeded well-established avenues of relief 
approved by the Supreme Court. This Note focuses on the changes in 
the specific habeas doctrine of procedural default. Part I provides the 
judicial and statutory development of habeas law. Part II outlines the 
goals of the Streamlined Procedures Act as proposed in 2005. Finally, 
Part III discusses how the plan proposed in the Act would effectively 
eradicate habeas relief and leave certain constitutional violations 
unremedied. 
I.  DEFINING HABEAS AND THE  
DOCTRINE OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 
When a prisoner is held in violation of the Constitution, treaties, 
or laws of the United States, that individual may petition for federal 
habeas relief.16 Upon receiving the habeas petition, a federal court 
may examine the trial court’s criminal conviction.17 If the conviction is 
held unconstitutional, the federal habeas court may discharge the 
 
 14. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005). Representative 
Daniel E. Lungren (R-CA) sponsored analogous legislation in the House of Representatives. 
Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 15. The last congressional action on the Streamlined Procedures Act was a Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing on Nov. 16, 2005. Bill Summary and Status for the 109th Congress-
S. 1088 (Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 
109:s.01088: (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). Although the SPA failed in the 109th Congress, if its 
steadfast supporters propose similar legislation in the future, this may implicate many of the 
same issues raised in this Note. 
 16. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 862 (4th ed. 2003). Habeas relief 
applies to individuals in custody following both state trials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), 
and federal trials, pursuant to § 2255. 
 17. Federal habeas review is a form of collateral relief, which differs from direct review of 
state court decisions. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 862 (explaining that a habeas 
“petition constitutes a separate civil suit filed in federal court”). 
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prisoner from custody.18 By releasing a prisoner held on a state court 
judgment, the federal habeas court “renders ineffective” the state law 
ground pursuant to which the judgment rested.19 
To promote the goals of federalism and comity, the Supreme 
Court held that, “in a federal system, the [s]tates should have the first 
opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state 
prisoner[s’] federal rights.”20 Specifically, habeas petitioners must first 
exhaust their claims in state court before submitting them for federal 
review. A petitioner who fails to raise a particular issue before the 
lower courts “has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 
address [that claim] in the first instance,”21 a principle known as 
“procedural default.” These claims are generally barred from habeas 
review.22 
A. Origins of Habeas and Subsequent Developments 
Habeas doctrine is expressly grounded in the U.S. Constitution. 
Article I, Section 9 affirms, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”23 Under the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, Congress granted federal courts authority to permit habeas 
for federal prisoners only.24 Later, following the Civil War, Congress 
extended to state prisoners the ability to seek habeas corpus relief if 
they were held “in violation of the constitution, or of any law or 
treaty of the United States.”25 Despite these early statutory 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). 
 20. Id. at 731. 
 21. Id. at 732. 
 22. Id. at 731. Procedurally defaulted claims are barred from subsequent habeas review 
unless they fall within one of two articulated exceptions. First, petitioner may succeed by 
demonstrating “cause” and “prejudice” for the procedural default. Second, a federal court may 
review such procedurally defaulted claims if petitioner has been subjected to a “fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.” See infra Part I.A. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 868. 
 25. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 
(2000)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 862 (stating that this extension of habeas 
rights stemmed from Congress’s distrust of state courts’ “ability and willingness . . . to protect 
federal rights”). 
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expansions, habeas law evolved primarily through judicial 
decisionmaking.26 
The Supreme Court has viewed habeas corpus as a tool for 
combating wrongful imprisonments and “convictions that violate 
‘fundamental fairness.’”27 In 1963, the Court advocated this 
protectionist stance in Fay v. Noia.28 By allowing “individual[s] 
convicted in state court [to] raise on habeas issues that were not 
presented at trial, unless it [could] be demonstrated that he or she 
deliberately chose to bypass the state procedures,”29 the Fay Court 
solidified its position that “a[n] [unintentional] forfeiture of remedies 
does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by which . . . [a] 
conviction was procured.”30 
This lenient gateway toward habeas relief was ultimately 
replaced by a more rigorous standard. In 1977, in Wainwright v. 
Sykes,31 the Court retracted its earlier focus on fundamental fairness 
and emphasized the need for efficiency and respect for state 
procedural rules.32 Implicitly overruling Fay, the Court held that 
claims not raised in state court can be presented for habeas review in 
federal courts only if there is good “cause” for the omission, and even 
then, only if the omission resulted in “prejudice.” By adopting the 
“cause and prejudice” doctrine, the Court aimed to “mak[e] the state 
trial on the merits the ‘main event,’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the 
road’ for what will later be the determinative federal habeas 
hearing.”33 
 
 26. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 27. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (“Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a 
bulwark against convictions that violate ‘fundamental fairness.’” (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977))). 
 28. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 
(1991). 
 29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 906. 
 30. Id. at 907. 
 31. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 32. See id. at 81 (“[I]t is a well-established principle of federalism that a state decision 
resting on an adequate foundation of state substantive law is immune from review in the federal 
courts.”). 
 33. Id. at 90. The Court explained that this standard “will afford an adequate guarantee . . . 
that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the 
federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be 
the victim of a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 90–91. 
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Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions followed this 
reasoning,34 it was not until Coleman v. Thompson35 in 1991 that the 
Court expressly overruled Fay and held that issues of procedural 
default must be decided under the “cause and prejudice” standard.36 
In Coleman, the Court espoused the goal of finality and sought to 
preserve the integrity and legitimacy of the state court system by 
allowing only two exceptions for petitioners who defaulted in state 
court. The first exception allows review of defaulted claims if the 
petitioner “can demonstrate [1] cause for the default and [2] actual 
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.”37 Second, 
petitioners may overcome the bar against such claims if they can 
“demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice.”38 
Despite the availability of these exceptions, the presumption 
against procedurally defaulted claims still bars most petitions for 
habeas relief. The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the “cause 
and prejudice” and “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standards, 
and these exceptions remain vague and difficult to prove.39 Although 
the Wainwright Court failed to define these terms,40 subsequent 
decisions provide insight into what is “sufficient ‘cause’ to excuse a 
state court procedural default and permit a habeas corpus petitioner 
to raise matters not presented in the state courts.”41 
In Engle v. Isaac,42 for example, the Court attempted to delineate 
what constitutes cause for a procedural default. In Engle, a petitioner 
sought habeas review of the constitutionality of jury instructions 
 
 34. E.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 99 U.S. 467, 493–94 (1991), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 
128–29 (1982). 
 35. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 36. Id. at 750. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 (“Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such 
objective impediments [constituting ‘cause’], we note that a showing that the factual or legal 
basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel or that ‘some interference by officials’ 
made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 40. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 (1977) (“Whatever precise content may be 
given those terms by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further elaboration that 
they do not exist here.”). 
 41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 911. 
 42. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). 
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delivered at his Ohio state trial.43 At the conclusion of petitioner’s 
initial trial, the judge instructed the jury that petitioner bore the 
burden of proving self defense by a preponderance of the evidence.44 
At that time, Ohio state courts typically required such a burden of 
proof for affirmative defenses.45 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
subsequently held that, due to this mistaken but established state 
practice, any objection to the burden of proof would have been 
futile.46 This futility constituted cause for petitioner’s waiver at trial, 
and petitioner had been prejudiced by the judge’s incorrect assertion 
of the burden of proof.47 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that 
because the defense counsel failed to object at trial, in violation of a 
separate Ohio contemporaneous objection rule, the issue could not be 
presented for habeas review.48 The Court emphasized its belief that 
the costs of foregoing finality outweighed the benefits of providing 
habeas relief to individuals imprisoned due to jury instructions that 
violated their constitutional rights.49 The Court further noted that 
the futility of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot 
alone constitute cause for failure to object at trial. If a defendant 
perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the 
federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he 
thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court 
that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide, 
upon reflection, that the contention is valid.50 
Therefore, although the precise term “cause” still remained 
undefined, the Engle Court established that failure to raise an 
objection at trial does not sufficiently satisfy the standard. 
There has been even less judicial elaboration on the definition of 
prejudice. The Court held in United States v. Frady51 that a petitioner 
must show that the trial outcome likely would have been different 
 
 43. Id. at 117. 
 44. Id. at 114. 
 45. Id. at 118. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 126–29. 
 49. Id. at 126–28. 
 50. Id. at 130. 
 51. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). 
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absent the alleged violation of the Constitution or federal law.52 This, 
too, is a tough standard to meet. The petitioner “must shoulder the 
burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a 
possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of 
constitutional dimensions.”53 
Likewise, the Court has attempted to elaborate what constitutes 
a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”54 This exception has been 
interpreted narrowly to include instances “where a constitutional 
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 
actually innocent.”55 Petitioners must present “new reliable evidence” 
that was absent at trial, such as DNA evidence or trustworthy 
eyewitness accounts.56 Unfortunately, because such evidence is not 
often present, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful. 
B. The First Legislative Hurdle: The Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
In 1996, Congress took action in the habeas arena. Addressing a 
growing desire for finality in the judicial process, Congress passed a 
bill that drastically restricted the availability of habeas relief: The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).57 The 
AEDPA imposed a statute of limitations on habeas petitions: 
prisoners have one year to apply for habeas relief.58 In addition, 
successive habeas petitions are barred unless approved by a U.S. 
Court of Appeals.59 The court of appeals may allow a successive 
petition only if the petitioner demonstrates either 
 
 52. Id. at 170. 
 53. Id. The burden required to demonstrate that prejudice occurred is greater than the 
standard necessary to show “plain error” for direct appeals. Id. at 166. 
 54. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313–15 (1995) (stating that the petitioner “may obtain 
review of his constitutional claims only if he falls within the ‘narrow class of cases . . . implicating 
a fundamental miscarriage of justice’” (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991))). 
 55. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The Court has clarified that “‘actual 
innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas 
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). 
 56. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 
 57. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000). 
 59. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 
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that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that applies 
retroactively; or if the factual predicate for the claim could not have 
been discovered previously and the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying offense.60 
Finally, courts have described the “key element”61 of the 
AEDPA as the provision that limits the scope of habeas review of 
constitutional claims previously “adjudicated on the merits.”62 Habeas 
relief is not available if a state court simply misapplied constitutional 
principles to the particular facts of a case. Rather, relief may be 
granted only if the state court ruling was “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”63 or if the 
state court adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented.”64 In this way, Congress has tried to limit the 
involvement of federal courts in deciding whether to grant habeas 
review. 
AEDPA supporters applaud the Act for creating a deferential 
standard to state court decisions—a standard stemming from 
concerns for finality and federalism articulated by the Supreme Court 
in developing habeas doctrine.65 Moreover, the restricted scope of 
review ultimately decreases the number of habeas petitions saturating 
federal courts, conserving judicial time and resources.66 The AEDPA, 
however, has exacted severe criticism from those who favor closer 
protection of individual rights. AEDPA opponents generally agree 
that efficiency is important, but in balancing interests, habeas 
 
 60. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 873. 
 61. Margery Miller, A Different View of Habeas: Interpreting AEDPA’s “Adjudicated on 
the Merits” Clause When Habeas Corpus is Understood as an Appellate Function of the Federal 
Courts, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2593, 2611 (2004). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[I]f the claim was not ‘adjudicated on the merits,’ the circuits 
agree that a federal court should apply the pre-AEDPA standard of review to the claim.” 
Miller, supra note 61, at 2612–13. 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 64. Id. § 2254(d)(2). 
 65. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for “Reasonably 
Erroneous” Applications of Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 746–47 (2002) (describing 
various interpretations of the deferential standard of review). 
 66. Miller, supra note 61, at 2611. 
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legislation should promote constitutional protections67 and thus 
ensure fundamental fairness. 
As a result of the AEDPA, many assertions of wrongful or 
unconstitutional trial court convictions are never reviewed on the 
merits.68 Concededly, a strong counterargument exists that a 
functioning court system requires finality to allow courts to adjudicate 
the entirety of their caseloads. Proponents of this viewpoint might 
argue that, unless defendants can prove they are actually innocent of 
crimes, there is little to gain by disrupting the finality of the state trial 
court’s decision. 
Yet a system which relies solely on actual innocence essentially 
ignores an entire population of prisoners who were convicted and 
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution.69 This Note asserts that 
procedural fairness is important for its own sake, even if some of the 
individuals afforded constitutional protection are actually guilty of 
the underlying crimes. Legislation—such as the AEDPA—that 
erodes such protection risks undermining public faith and confidence 
in the legal system. 
II.  A POSSIBLE BLOW TO HABEAS:  
THE STREAMLINED PROCEDURES ACT 
Senator Kyl proposed legislation in the 109th Congress to narrow 
the already constrained scope of federal habeas review.70 The stated 
purpose of this legislation, the Streamlined Procedures Act (SPA), 
was to implement streamlined procedures for federal courts to follow 
on collateral review of habeas petitions, and the Act specifically 
addressed procedurally defaulted claims.71 The SPA would have 
effectively denied or restricted the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
hear habeas corpus petitions that (1) have been procedurally barred 
in a state court,72 (2) are based upon errors in sentences or sentencing 
 
 67. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 367 (“These advocates regard habeas corpus as 
symbolic of a commitment to constitutional values and to the ideal that no person shall be 
convicted in violation of the fundamental law of the land.”). 
 68. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to 
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 350 (2006). 
 69. Id. at 346; see also infra Part III.B. 
 70. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 71. S. 1088 pmbl. 
 72. Id. § 4. 
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ruled harmless error by a state court,73 (3) pertain to capital cases,74 or 
(4) challenge the exercise of a “[s]tate’s executive clemency or pardon 
power.”75 
Essentially, the SPA would have confiscated from federal courts 
the jurisdiction over habeas review of both procedurally defaulted 
and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.76 In relevant portion, the 
SPA mandated that 
[a] court, justice, or judge shall not have jurisdiction to consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court with respect to 
any claim that was found by the State court to be procedurally 
barred, or any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to 
such claim, unless . . . the claim would qualify for consideration on 
the grounds described in [28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)].77 
To fulfill the criteria of § 2254(e)(2) under the SPA, federal 
habeas petitioners would have been required to demonstrate that the 
procedurally defaulted claim either (1) relies on a new and 
retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law that was unavailable 
during petitioner’s initial trial, or (2) rests on factual grounds which 
could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence.78 In 
addition, habeas petitioners would have borne the burden of showing 
that “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the [petitioner] guilty of the 
underlying offense.”79 By incorporating this strict standard, the SPA 
would have changed the law of procedural default by barring all 
defaulted claims unless the petitioner could show actual innocence of 
the underlying crime.80 
 
 73. Id. § 6. 
 74. Id. § 9. 
 75. Id. § 10(a). 
 76. See id. § 4(a)(2) (“A court, justice, or judge shall not have jurisdiction to consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . [for] any claim that was found by the State court to be 
procedurally barred, or any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
 79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (2000). 
 80. See 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (daily ed. May 19, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (describing 
how the SPA will permit “procedurally improper claims to go forward only if they present 
meaningful evidence that the defendant did not commit the crime”). 
03__HERTZ.DOC 6/7/2007  4:13 PM 
1330 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1319 
Stressing the need for finality, SPA supporters emphasized that 
such legislation was necessary to reduce delays in resolving criminal 
convictions.81 Given that many habeas cases take ten or twenty years 
to resolve, the sponsors argued that such a bill was necessary to ease 
the flood of habeas petitions.82 Moreover, the delays are “deeply 
unfair” to victims of serious crimes because they postpone the ability 
to gain closure.83 In urging support for the SPA, Senator Kyl stated, 
“A parent whose child has been murdered, or someone who has been 
the victim of a violent assault, cannot be expected to ‘move on’ 
without knowing how the case against the attacker has been 
resolved.”84 
The Act also attempted to combat claimed defects in habeas 
review, including the ability of federal habeas courts to “reweigh[] 
evidence or entertain[] claims that have not been decided by state 
courts.”85 This reflected earlier concerns about defense attorneys 
strategically “sandbagging” their claims to preserve arguments for 
habeas review.86 Supporters additionally argued that permitting 
federal courts to review claims that had procedurally defaulted in 
 
 81. Id. Such views have also been expressed in earlier judicial attempts to narrow the scope 
of habeas review. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492 (1991) (“‘A procedural system 
which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate 
certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice . . . .’” (quoting Paul M. 
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 441, 452 (1963))), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 
110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982) (“‘[B]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest 
in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to 
litigation . . . .’” (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting))). 
 82. See 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“Currently, many Federal habeas 
corpus cases require 10, 15, or even 20 years to complete.”); see also McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 
(“Federal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources, and 
threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes.”). 
 83. 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also Marcia Coyle, Congress Looks 
at More Limits on Habeas, NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 1 (noting that Senator Kyl has argued 
that there is a “need for closure for victims and their families, which can only be accomplished 
by reducing the backlog of habeas petitions”). 
 84. 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 85. See Coyle, supra note 83. 
 86. See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491–92 (“[H]abeas corpus review may give litigants 
incentives to withhold claims for manipulative purposes and may establish disincentives to 
present claims when evidence is fresh.”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (criticizing 
that habeas “may encourage ‘sandbagging’ on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their 
chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional 
claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off”). 
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state courts “deprives the trial court of an opportunity to correct any 
error without retrial, . . . gives state appellate courts no chance to 
review trial errors, and . . . undercut[s] the [s]tate’s ability to enforce 
its procedural rules.”87 This view has been continually articulated by 
courts seeking to restore independent state powers.88 The Supreme 
Court stated that “[r]eexamination of state convictions on federal 
habeas frustrates . . . both the [s]tates’ sovereign power to punish 
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional 
rights.”89 Furthermore, supporters of such habeas restriction argued 
that the ability to seek repeated habeas review detracts from the 
respect for the trial as the main event. Such liberal availability of 
habeas “degrades the prominence of the trial itself.”90 
In addition, sponsors promoted the SPA’s ultimate effect: 
establishing a uniform standard of reviewing procedurally defaulted 
claims.91 All federal courts would be barred from reviewing habeas 
petitions unless the petitioner presents meaningful evidence of actual 
innocence.92 This would eliminate much of the guesswork undertaken 
by states to determine what constitutes good cause and prejudice for 
a procedurally defaulted claim. 
III.  THE INTOLERABLE CONSEQUENCES  
OF THE STREAMLINED PROCEDURES ACT 
In its attempt to streamline judicial procedures in pursuit of 
finality, proposals like the SPA would effectively “strip the federal 
courts of what limited jurisdiction they now have over constitutional 
habeas claims of state prisoners.”93 Section A discusses how the SPA 
nearly eradicated the availability of habeas relief to petitioners. 
Section B then addresses the Act’s troubling potential outcome of 
leaving victims of constitutional violations without remedies. 
 
 87. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986). 
 88. E.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 (“Our federal system recognizes the independent 
power of a [s]tate to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a [s]tate to 
pass laws means little if the [s]tate cannot enforce them.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982). 
 91. 151 CONG. REC. S5540 (daily ed. May 19, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[T]he SPA 
creates uniform, clear procedures for review of procedurally improper claims.”). 
 92. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 93. Barbara Bergman, Great Writ Endangered, 29 CHAMPION, Oct. 29, 2005, at 4, 4. 
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A. The Streamlined Procedures Act Would Effectively Obliterate 
Habeas Relief 
The most troubling prospect of the SPA was the Act’s 
elimination of the cause and prejudice standard. To attain habeas 
review of a procedurally defaulted claim under the SPA 
requirements, a petitioner must prove that “no reasonable factfinder” 
would have found petitioner guilty had the new “factual grounds” 
been available during the initial trial. The SPA standard for habeas 
review was thus tantamount to a showing of actual innocence via new 
reliable evidence. Yet because petitioners rarely possess such 
evidence, the Act would have effectively removed habeas as an 
option for prisoners held in violation of their constitutional rights. 
The Supreme Court has frequently articulated that the “actual 
innocence” standard comprises a narrow exception.94 In Murray v. 
Carrier,95 the Court asserted, “in an extraordinary case, where a 
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one 
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ 
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural 
default.”96 In the 1994 case Schlup v. Delo,97 the Court elaborated: a 
petitioner must demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred 
“probably result[ing] in the conviction of one who is actually 
innocent.”98 This requires a petitioner to bring forth “new reliable 
evidence” that is virtually dispositive in proving innocence and that 
was absent at trial.99 Sufficient new reliable evidence may include 
DNA, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or other forms of physical 
evidence.100 The Court acknowledged, however, that because such 
 
 94. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992) (“[W]e have emphasized the 
narrow scope of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.”). 
 95. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). 
 96. Id. at 496; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 918 (“At most, Herrera v. Collins 
stands for the proposition that a habeas petitioner seeking relief by claiming that newly 
discovered evidence demonstrates actual innocence has a very heavy burden to meet.”). 
 97. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
 98. Id. at 327. In Schlup, the Court rejected an earlier approach taken in Sawyer, which 
required a petitioner to “show by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error 
at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death 
penalty under [the applicable state] law.” Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 350; see also House v. Bell, 126 S. 
Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006) (affirming that “the Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only 
in the ‘extraordinary’ case”). 
 99. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 
 100. Id. 
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exculpatory evidence is absent in most instances, “claims of actual 
innocence are rarely successful.”101 
For example, the 2006 case of House v. Bell102 demonstrates the 
extensive showing of exculpatory evidence that may be required. In 
this case, petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death 
based on circumstantial evidence.103 Petitioner sought habeas relief 
and presented an extensive amount of new evidence to support his 
actual innocence claim.104 Specifically, petitioner offered DNA test 
results showing the semen on the victim’s nightgown and panties 
matched her husband’s DNA rather than the petitioner’s.105 In 
addition, new expert testimony indicated that the blood on 
petitioner’s pants was “chemically too degraded” to have come from 
the victim on the night of the murder.106 Instead, the expert concluded 
that the blood had spilled from the vials of autopsy samples onto 
petitioner’s jeans.107 Furthermore, the expert confirmed that the blood 
vials had not been properly sealed, had been transported in the same 
cardboard box as petitioner’s pants, and a vial and a half had emptied 
throughout the ten-hour journey to the FBI laboratory.108 
The Supreme Court recognized the main forensic evidence that 
linked petitioner to the murder—the semen and blood samples—was 
highly dubious. As a result, the Court concluded that House was the 
rare case in which the new evidence would likely cause “any 
reasonable juror [to] have reasonable doubt.”109 Thus, petitioner’s 
compelling claim of actual innocence allowed him to bypass the 
procedural bar to habeas relief. 
 
 101. Id.; see also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004) (maintaining that “actual 
innocence” is intended to be a narrow standard); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 
(1998) (noting that “actual innocence” is more than “mere legal insufficiency”); Arrington v. 
Williams, 195 F. App’x 761, 762 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[F]undamental miscarriages of justice are 
‘extremely rare.’” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324)). 
 102. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006). 
 103. See id. at 2071–75 (discussing petitioner’s bruised arms and hands, blood-stained pants, 
and semen sample as factors leading to petitioner’s capital murder conviction). 
 104. See id. at 2078–80 (presenting DNA evidence as well as new expert testimony in 
support of his “actual innocence” claim). 
 105. Id. at 2078–79. 
 106. See id. at 2080 (describing the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner’s testimony regarding 
the decay and enzyme degradation within blood samples). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2077, 2086. 
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Yet such extensive exculpatory evidence is seldom available. The 
Supreme Court repeatedly expressed the extraordinary nature of 
House’s circumstances throughout the opinion.110 Moreover, a 
multitude of other federal habeas cases have denied actual innocence 
claims when new reliable evidence was not quite so overwhelming. 
For example, in Arrington v. Williams,111 the petitioner presented 
evidence that a government witness had committed perjury at 
petitioner’s trial.112 Petitioner presented new excerpts from an earlier 
hearing indicating that the witness had reached a deal with 
prosecutors to testify against petitioner in exchange for a reduction of 
his own pending sentence.113 Furthermore, the content of the excerpts 
suggested that the witness had mischaracterized the negotiations 
during petitioner’s trial.114 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that this new evidence would have solely been useful to impeach the 
witness.115 Because impeachment evidence is “a step removed from 
evidence pertaining to the crime itself,” such evidence can rarely 
support a finding of “actual innocence.”116 
In Wadlington v. United States,117 petitioner supplemented his 
habeas petition with affidavits from four individuals who attested to 
petitioner’s lack of involvement with a drug conspiracy.118 The 
affidavits attacked earlier trial testimony regarding petitioner’s drug 
activities.119 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless 
rejected petitioner’s new evidence because “recantations of testimony 
generally are viewed with suspicion.”120 Furthermore, there remained 
other evidence connecting petitioner to the conspiracy.121 
Similarly, the results of new psychological evaluations may not 
suffice. In Griffin v. Johnson,122 petitioner presented hospital records 
 
 110. E.g., id. at 2068, 2086. 
 111. Arrington v. Williams, 195 F. App’x 761 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 112. Id. at 762. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 766. 
 116. Id. at 764 (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 563 (1998)). 
 117. Wadlington v. United States, 428 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 118. Id. at 782. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 784; see also Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting new 
affidavits which corroborated that petitioner was not at the victim’s residence at the time of the 
murder because subsequent exculpatory affidavits are “suspect”). 
 121. Wadlington, 428 F.3d at 784. 
 122. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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to invoke an insanity defense in order to satisfy the “actual 
innocence” standard for intentional murder.123 The new records 
diagnosed petitioner with “Chronic Brain Syndrome Associated with 
Convulsive Disorder with Behavioral Reaction.”124 Other new 
evidence included a psychologist’s evaluation concluding that 
petitioner suffered from an “Organic Brain Syndrome” and “Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder due to past physical and sexual abuse.”125 
Petitioner argued that the above evidence demonstrated his inability 
to “form[] the requisite mental intent to be guilty of murder.”126 The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this claim, however, 
explaining that “the mere presentation of new psychological 
evaluations . . . does not constitute a colorable showing of actual 
innocence.”127 The court reasoned that psychologists may disagree on 
what constitutes a mental illness, and defendants would likely seek 
out psychologists who would render a favorable examination.128 
Evidently, most petitioners cannot obtain the same degree of 
compelling new evidence that the Supreme Court was willing to 
accept as demonstrating “actual innocence” in House. This is a 
disconcerting consequence of efforts like the SPA. Most prisoners 
held in violation of the Constitution will lack overwhelming evidence 
of actual innocence and therefore will be unable to meet such an 
onerous standard.129 
B. The Streamlined Procedures Act Would Leave Victims of 
Constitutional Violations Without Remedies 
Even if the SPA would have effectively streamlined the 
interpretation of habeas doctrine, it still would have yielded the 
undesirable effect of streamlining processes designed to preserve 
constitutional protections. The most troubling aspect of the SPA was 
the Act’s potential substantive effect of allowing constitutional 
 
 123. Id. at 963–64. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 964–65. 
 126. Id. at 965. 
 127. Id. (quoting Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1516 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Vivian Berger, Streamlining Injustice, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 23 (“The 
proverbial camel could have navigated the needle’s eye more easily than a prisoner will be able 
to satisfy this provision.”); Coyle, supra note 83 (quoting Bryan Stevenson of the Equal Justice 
Initiative in Montgomery, AL, contending that “[e]ssentially [the SPA] would end federal 
habeas corpus for almost everyone in prison with the exception of a very, very small number”). 
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violations to go unremedied. By requiring petitioners to effectively 
prove their actual innocence, the Act foreclosed the ability to attain 
habeas relief by demonstrating cause and prejudice. Thus, in addition 
to overturning decades of Supreme Court precedent, the SPA would 
have had the procedural effect of denying review in various 
circumstances when it had been previously, and rightfully, granted. 
1. The Right to Effective Counsel.  Specifically, the cause and 
prejudice exception has been used repeatedly as an avenue for 
exercising basic constitutional rights, such as the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.130 The Sixth Amendment, defining the basic 
components of a fair trial, expressly includes this right in the Counsel 
Clause.131 The Supreme Court has recognized that this vital safeguard 
exists “in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”132 Such 
a fair trial can only be rendered truly fair if constitutional rights are 
honored, whether the petitioner is guilty or innocent. Furthermore, in 
Strickland v. Washington,133 the Supreme Court cautioned that the 
mere presence of a trial attorney beside the accused does not satisfy 
the Sixth Amendment.134 Precisely, “the right to counsel is the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.”135 This right is denied when 
 
 130. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984) (“The purpose of the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance 
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in 
counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective 
assistance under the Constitution.”). 
 131. The Counsel Clause provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the [s]tate and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 132. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368 (1993) 
(applying Strickland); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding that the 
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants is a fundamental right); Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938) (holding that a criminal defendant’s right to assistance of 
counsel is “one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure 
fundamental human rights of life and liberty”), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 133. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 134. Id. at 685. 
 135. Id. at 686 (emphasis added) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 
(1970)). 
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defense counsel fails to provide “adequate legal assistance.”136 The 
Strickland Court articulated a two-pronged test to determine when 
defense counsel’s performance was so inadequate that it warrants 
reversal of the conviction,137 requiring the petitioner to demonstrate 
(1) that counsel’s assistance was deficient,138 and (2) that counsel’s 
assistance prejudiced the defense.139 Strickland’s “ineffective 
assistance” test has been applied in countless court decisions that 
subsequently reaffirmed the right to effective assistance of counsel.140 
Notably, the SPA sought to repeal this sequence of judicial 
affirmations. The Act expressly amended habeas doctrine by stating 
that “[a] court . . . shall not have jurisdiction to consider . . . any claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel related to such [procedurally 
barred state] claim[s].”141 Even absent this explicit restriction, the SPA 
would likely have eliminated these claims through its requirement 
that a petitioner demonstrate actual innocence in order to attain 
habeas relief. Yet if petitioners cannot initially argue a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, they may be unaware of what other 
legal errors have emerged during trial. Subsequently, it may be 
impossible, in some cases, for a petitioner to prove actual innocence 
without first demonstrating prejudice caused by counsel’s defective 
performance. This fatal flaw was addressed before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee during hearings on the Act.142 Barry Scheck, 
cofounder of the Innocence Project, asserted that this is “exactly why 
so many innocence cases do not start out presenting innocence claims 
at all, but rather procedural due process violations, and proof of 
innocence only emerges once the rubble of other legal errors has 
 
 136. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)); id. (“The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”) 
 137. Id. at 687. 
 138. See id. (“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 139. See id. (“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”). 
 140. E.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 
(2003); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993). 
 141. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. § 4(h)(1) (2005). 
 142. See Bergman, supra note 93, at 4 (“[T]he wrongly convicted ordinarily cannot prove 
their innocence until they have competent counsel . . . and perhaps most important of all, a full 
and fair hearing on the merits of their procedural due process claims . . . .”). 
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been swept aside.”143 By destroying the means to “sweep aside” the 
procedural legal errors, the SPA effectively would have denied 
prisoners the means to prove their actual innocence.144 
This would have devastating implications for underprivileged 
petitioners. Prisoners held in violation of their constitutional rights, 
and without the means to secure quality defense, would be held 
accountable for the defective performance of their attorneys. 
Concededly, attorneys generally serve as agents of the accused. It is 
not always appropriate, however, to bind defendants by their 
attorneys’ poor strategic choices, particularly when such choices are 
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair [and reliable] trial.”145 
Left without a remedy, defendants face imprisonment in violation of 
their constitutional rights.146 The SPA left no avenue for relief in these 
instances. Instead, in its pursuit for finality, Congress would have 
bound petitioners to state court convictions from trials which were 
neither full nor fair.147 
As a practical matter, the Act would have required federal courts 
to tolerate deprivations of this right in the most extraordinary of 
instances in which it was once afforded.148 For example, in Williams v. 
Taylor,149 defense counsel failed to investigate and present substantial 
mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury about defendant’s 
“mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early childhood” and 
testimony that defendant was “borderline mentally retarded.”150 
Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith,151 counsel failed to thoroughly 
investigate defendant’s sordid background, and thus did not present 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369 (“‘[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to 
receive a fair trial.’” (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984))). 
 145. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 146. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 909 (explaining that the bypass test “refuses to 
credit what is essentially a lawyer’s mistake as a forfeiture of constitutional rights”). 
 147. See Bergman, supra note 93, at 4 (“What this bill would do is speed up the execution of 
men and women who did not have the resources or competent counsel to prove that they 
were . . . innocent.”). 
 148. See Coyle, supra note 83 (“According to the ABA, a federal court would have to accept 
at face value a state court’s decision . . . that the prisoner or his attorney failed to comply with [a 
procedural] requirement, and that, in consequence, the state court declined to consider the 
prisoner’s federal claim.”). 
 149. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 150. Id. at 370. 
 151. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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available mitigating evidence at his client’s sentencing.152 The 
Supreme Court stated that such representation “fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”153 Regardless of whether 
petitioners are actually innocent, “all persons, even those who have 
been convicted, are entitled to claim the benefits of constitutional 
rules.”154 Under the SPA, however, the Court would have been 
required to tolerate such unreasonableness and deny relief to 
“victims” of such deficient representation. Thus, proposals like the 
SPA would strip the Court of its power to safeguard the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.155 
2. The SPA Endangered Other Constitutional Rights.  The SPA 
jeopardized other constitutional rights as well. For example, the Act 
provided no relief to petitioners whose jury selection was tainted by 
racial bias,156 compromising constitutional protections. The Supreme 
Court has held that, when a state court tries a defendant before a jury 
from which members of defendant’s race have been purposefully 
excluded, the trial may violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.157 Under established habeas doctrine, a petitioner 
may demonstrate that the trial prosecutor “perverted” use of the 
peremptory challenge system during the trial by intentionally 
objecting to the seating of jurors of the same race as the petitioner.158 
Although peremptory challenges remain a viable jury selection tool 
for other purposes, “[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude 
 
 152. Id. at 522. 
 153. Id. at 521. 
 154. Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 368; see also id. (noting that habeas review is necessary to 
“correct constitutional mistakes”). 
 155. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (“[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure 
that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of 
fact.”); see also id. (“[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas review] is not the petitioners’ 
innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been 
preserved.”). 
 156. See Ira Reiner, Legal Railroading Disguised as Efficiency, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at 
B11 (“The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005 . . . would not . . . allow for review . . . when a 
conviction was tainted by racial bias in jury selection.”). 
 157. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 158. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965) (describing how a petitioner may raise 
an inference of “purposeful discrimination” by showing that the prosecutor has been repeatedly 
“responsible for the removal of [qualified blacks] who have survived challenges for cause, with 
the result that no [blacks] ever served on petit juries”), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–94 (1986) (describing 
how a defendant may establish a prima facie case of this violation). 
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black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness 
of our system of justice.”159 
Even though the SPA did not explicitly strip federal courts of the 
power to review jury bias claims—unlike its treatment of ineffective 
assistance claims160—this would be a likely result of such legislation. 
By removing the availability of the cause and prejudice exception, 
federal courts would have no authority to remedy violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection unless petitioners 
can prove they are actually innocent. Thus, again the SPA sought 
expedience at the expense of important constitutional safeguards. 
The SPA would have similarly limited Sixth Amendment 
protections contained in the Confrontation Clause, which provides 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”161 The 
Supreme Court has continuously affirmed the significance of the 
ability to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses162 to ensure 
“the accuracy of the truth-determining process.”163 Although the 
Court has noted that this protection is not absolute and “may, in 
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in 
the criminal trial process,”164 the SPA would have forced the 
Confrontation Clause to bow permanently to the Act’s goal of 
finality. 
By limiting protection of the right to confront witnesses, the SPA 
would have opened the door for harrowing consequences that 
undermine the very purpose of the Confrontation Clause. The 
drafters of the Constitution included the right to confront witnesses in 
the Sixth Amendment to protect against controversial examination 
procedures, the most notable being those used in political trials in 
 
 159. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. 
 160. See Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088 § 4(h)(1) (2005) (removing federal 
jurisdiction to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the state expressly waives 
the restriction); see also supra Part III.B.1. 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 162. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that when the defendant 
lacked the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, the exclusion of such critical 
evidence, added to the state’s refusal to permit questioning, denied the defendant “a trial in 
accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process”). 
 163. Id. at 295; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (discussing this 
“bedrock procedural guarantee”). 
 164. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295. 
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16th and 17th century England.165 In Crawford v. Washington,166 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, recounted the controversial 1603 
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, and concluded that the framers sought to 
prevent such abuses when drafting the Confrontation Clause.167 In 
that case, Raleigh’s accomplice in his alleged treason implicated him 
in both a letter and an examination before the Privy Council.168 These 
accusations were read at Raleigh’s trial, and the court rejected 
Raleigh’s demands to have his accomplice testify, and hopefully 
recant his accusations, in the courtroom.169 The jury convicted Raleigh 
and sentenced him to death, despite Raleigh’s protests that he was 
being tried “by the Spanish Inquisition.”170 To stem such abuses, the 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment must be interpreted to prevent 
the use of ex parte examinations against the defendant.171 
Disturbingly, the SPA would have reduced federal courts’ ability 
to protect against these evils. When a petitioner alleges violation of 
this “bedrock”172 right in the event of a procedurally defaulted claim, 
violation of this Sixth Amendment right may go unremedied under 
such a proposal unless the petitioner can prove actual innocence. 
Years of judicial development of Confrontation Clause doctrine 
would be squandered as the rights ensured thereby would become 
effectively “rights without remedies.” The confrontation right would 
still exist, but there would be no teeth for enforcing this protection in 
instances of procedural default. Further, when coupled with the lack 
of availability of ineffectual assistance claims, many petitioners might 
be unaware that such a right exists. 
3. The SPA Would Provide No Remedies for Exceptional State 
Law Abuses. In certain instances, courts grant habeas relief even 
when the specific procedural default does not rise to the level of 
constitutional violation, using the cause and prejudice standard. For 
example, in Murray v. Carrier, the Supreme Court refused to create 
an “exhaustive catalog” of adequate “objective impediments,” yet 
 
 165. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (“The most notorious of civil-law examinations occurred in 
the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries.”) 
 166. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
 167. Id. at 44. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 50. 
 172. Id. at 42. 
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noted that “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was 
not reasonably available to counsel . . . or that ‘some interference by 
officials’ . . . made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 
under this standard.”173 The reasonable unavailability of a claim 
defeats the concern of “sandbagging” that the Court earlier expressed 
in Wainwright v. Sykes.174 
This exception should also be made available because legal 
concepts tend to mature slowly, “finding partial acceptance in some 
courts while meeting rejection in others.”175 Therefore, it is not logical 
to assume, or require, that attorneys are aware of all constitutional 
questions that have yet to fully develop. Moreover, if courts were to 
hold otherwise and make attorneys accountable for novel issues, this 
may “actually disrupt state-court proceedings by encouraging defense 
counsel to include any and all remotely plausible constitutional claims 
that could someday gain recognition.”176 This could undermine the 
SPA’s very purpose of accelerating judicial process. 
Furthermore, to deny habeas relief when government agents 
interfered with procedural efforts would unequivocally violate the 
habeas doctrine’s goal of fundamental fairness. For example, in Dowd 
v. United States ex rel. Cook,177 the Supreme Court held that when 
prison officials had prevented a prisoner from sending out his appeal 
documents, the prisoner was not barred from seeking habeas relief.178 
Even when the restrictions were revoked by a new prison warden, the 
prisoner’s claims were not procedurally barred.179 The Supreme Court 
reiterated that interference by law enforcement officials is sufficient 
to constitute cause.180 The alternative would lead to absurdly unjust 
and troubling consequences. Proposals like the SPA may essentially 
produce this horrific result, by removing cause and prejudice as an 
avenue for relief. 
 
 173. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 
 174. See supra note 86; see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1984) (noting that if a 
constitutional claim is unavailable, “it is safe to assume that . . . we cannot attribute to [counsel] 
strategic motives of any sort”). 
 175. Reed, 468 U.S. at 15. 
 176. Id. at 16–17. 
 177. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951). 
 178. Id. at 208–09. 
 179. Id. 
 180. E.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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Finally, successors to the SPA might require federal courts to 
ignore individual cases in which a state trial court “exorbitantly” 
applied the law. For instance, in Lee v. Kemna,181 a Missouri trial 
court heard a murder case in which the defendant had planned an 
alibi defense that he was in California with his family at the time of 
the murder.182 Yet the alibi witnesses had left the courthouse, a 
development unanticipated by the defense.183 Defense counsel moved 
for a continuance until the following morning to locate the alibi 
witnesses and enforce the subpoena.184 The trial judge denied the 
request, however, explaining that he would not be in court the next 
day because “my daughter is going to be in the hospital all 
day . . . [s]o I’ve got to stay with her.”185 The judge also denied defense 
counsel’s request for a postponement until the following business day, 
stating that he had another trial set for that day.186 The defendant was 
convicted.187 On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction, ruling that the defendant failed to comply with a state law 
that required continuance requests to be made in writing and 
accompanied by affidavits.188 
The U.S. Supreme Court noted, on habeas review, that 
“[o]rdinarily, violation of ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ 
state rules . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal 
claim.”189 The petitioner’s case nevertheless fit within a “limited 
category” of exceptional cases in which “exorbitant application” of a 
state rule renders the state ground inadequate to bar habeas review.190 
Compliance with the Missouri state rule requiring written 
continuance requests would not have changed the outcome because 
the judge denied the request for a “reason that could not have been 
countered by a perfect motion for continuance.”191 Furthermore, the 
 
 181. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002). 
 182. Id. at 367. 
 183. Id. at 369. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 370. 
 187. Id. at 365. 
 188. Id. at 372. 
 189. Id. at 376. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 381 (noting that the judge’s stated reasons of his daughter’s hospitalization and 
another scheduled trial would not have been affected by a continuance request precisely in 
compliance with Missouri law). 
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Missouri law did not mandate “flawless compliance” with the state 
rule in the unique circumstances of the case.192 Finally, given “the 
realities of the trial,” the defendant substantially complied with the 
state rule by explaining the reasons for his continuance request.193 
Although any other outcome of Lee would seem to deny the 
petitioner a fair trial, the SPA left no room for such “exorbitant” 
exceptions to apply. Thus, petitioners will be unarmed against abuse 
by state courts unless they can somehow show actual innocence. For 
example, in Lee, the petitioner would have likely failed because he 
had no means to secure the critical alibi witnesses. Likewise, similarly 
situated petitioners may be unable to demonstrate their innocence if 
impeded by unlawful state court procedures.194 
CONCLUSION 
The compromise of constitutional rights contemplated by the 
SPA and its potential progeny may provide courts with gains in speed 
and finality. In balancing fairness against efficiency, however, 
Congress should generally favor the scrupulous protection of 
constitutional rights over expediting the resolution of cases. 
Otherwise, basic constitutional rights could be systematically denied 
to a large segment of the population who may lack the knowledge or 
resources to attain adequate representation. 
Thus, Congress should allow federal courts to retain jurisdiction 
over enforcing fundamental constitutional rights. As the Supreme 
Court has held, “[t]here can be no doubt that in enacting § 2254, 
Congress [expressly intended] to ‘interpose the federal courts 
between the [s]tates and the people, as guardians of the people’s 
federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action.’”195 
To strip federal courts of this power leaves the Constitution without 
teeth against state court abuse. Congress should reject any future 
ideological successors to the Streamlined Procedures Act to avoid 
“streamlining” procedures needed to preserve fundamental 
constitutional protections. 
 
 192. Id. at 382. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Saltzburg, supra note 10, at 367 (noting the importance of protecting constitutional 
rights due to suspicion of the manner in which state courts consider federal constitutional 
issues). 
 195. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
